General 19 Aug 2008 11:37 am

Six Rules for Rewriting

The only way I know to write well is to first allow myself to write freely, and then to rewrite. The trick to rewriting is to recognize which bits of my writing are good, and leave those be, while improving or eliminating the bad bits.

Here is a list of six rules that help me recognize the bad bits in my own writing. Until these criteria have been met, or the exceptions identified and understood, my writing is still in draft, not yet ready to be abandoned to the reader.

Making your writing striking

Every sentence should grab the reader and propel them forward: Academics are wont to ignore this rule, believing the reader should be willing to endure any pain for a sufficient payoff. Of course, academics aren’t paid per reader. Good bloggers and journalists know better.

Every paragraph should contain a striking idea, originally expressed: In the meat of your writing, this rule ought to be easy to apply. If you are finding it difficult, you may not have thought deeply enough about the subject, and perhaps should think more before attempting to write.

Where the rule causes difficulty is when you are covering background material. Some readers may already be familiar with the background, and you run the risk of boring them if you offer the standard account. Renowned for his originality as a teacher, Richard Feynman once taught inclined planes to physics undergraduates. Do you believe he offered the standard account of inclined planes that has bored students around the world for generations? I have no doubt he found a new and fascinating take on the material. If Feynman can do it for inclined planes, you can do it for your background material, no matter how apparently mundane.

The most significant ideas should be distilled into the most potent sentences possible: These provide a focus for the reader, a message that helps them understand your main points. To apply this rule, go through each section and chapter, asking yourself what the most significant ideas are, and if they have been distilled into a simple, memorable core.

Stylistic rules

There are many rules for writing with good style. Here are the two rules I find most useful.

Use the strongest appropriate verb: Identify the verb in every sentence, and ask if you can improve it, perhaps eliminating adjectives and adverbs in the process. This is simple and mechanical, but often yields great improvements with little effort.

Beware of nominalization: A common way we weaken verbs is by turning them into nouns, and then combining them with weaker verbs. This bad habit is called nominalization. Contrast the wishy-washy “I conducted an investigation of rules for rewriting” with the more direct “I investigated rules for rewriting”. In the first sentence I have nominalized the strong verb “investigated” so that it becomes the noun “investigation”, and then combined it with the weaker verb “conducted”.

Meta-rule

None of the above rules should be consciously applied while drafting material: While drafting, your mind must be fully concentrated on the subject matter at hand. It is nearly impossible to think clearly about the subject if you are simultaneously trying to obey a bunch of rules. Think deeply about your material; write with all the passion, speed and concentration at your disposal; only once you are done should you identify problems, and then rewrite any parts that offend.

General 19 Aug 2008 10:45 am

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Quantum & Essays & Physics 04 Aug 2008 08:30 am

Why the world needs quantum mechanics

Conventional wisdom holds that quantum mechanics is hard to learn. This is more or less correct, although often overstated. However, the necessity of abandoning conventional ways of thinking about the world, and finding a radically new way - quantum mechanics - can be understood by any intelligent person willing to spend some time concentrating hard. Conveying that understanding is the purpose of this essay.

Reading the essay requires a little more effort than most blog posts. The argument is occasionally a little abstract, and you may need to read over some paragraphs quite carefully, or perhaps more than once. Ideally, you’ll test your understanding by explaining the entire argument to someone else. The effort is worth it, for when you’re done, you’ll understand one of the great discoveries of all time: why the world needs quantum mechanics.

One of the challenges of understanding modern physics is that some of the concepts seem quite abstract when you’re talking about microscopic objects outside the realm of everyday experience. So let’s first get our bearings in a more conventional setting.

I want to talk about coins. We take it for granted that we can determine whether a coin has landed heads or tails; these seem like self-evident properties. But actually quite a lot is going on when we make that determination. Sunlight or some other type of light has to bounce off the coin, into your eye, stimulate your optic nerve, before finally registering either “heads” or “tails” in your brain [1].

This process of figuring out whether the coin is heads or tails is what physicists call a measurement process. In physicists’ language, what’s going on when we look at the coin is that we’re measuring a two-valued or binary property of the coin. This usage of the term measurement is somewhat different from everyday usage, where, for example, we might measure something with a ruler. But the basic idea is the same - a measurement is a process that determines a physical property, whether it be the length of an object, or the side a coin has landed.

All this language may seem pedantic - we’re just looking at a coin! But it comes in handy when we move to the microscopic realm of photons, the tiny particles that make up light. When you see red light, for example, what’s going on is that lots and lots of red photons are entering your eye. The more that enter, the brighter the red sensation.

Photons, like coins, can have binary properties. One of those properties is something called polarization. You’re probably already familiar with polarization, although you may not realize it. If you take a pair of sunglasess, and hold them up towards the surface of the ocean or a pool on a sunny day, you’ll notice that depending on the angle you hold the sunglasses, different amounts of light come through. What this means is that depending on the angle, different numbers of photons are coming through [2].

Imagine, for example, that you hold the sunglasses horizontally:

The photons that make it through the sunglasses have what is called horizontal polarization. Not all photons coming toward the sunglasses have this polarization, which is why not all of the photons make it through. In our earlier language, what’s going on is that the sunglasses are measuring the photons coming toward the sunglasses, to determine whether or not they have horizontal polarization. Those which do, pass through the sunglasses; those which do not, are blocked. Again, it’s not quite the everyday meaning of “measurement”, but hopefully you’re getting the hang of the physicists’ language.

There are other, different physical properties that can be measured in a similar way. For example, imagine holding the sunglasses at 45 degrees to horizontal:

The photons that make it through the sunglasses have a polarization at 45 degrees to horizontal. In our earlier language, these sunglasses are again measuring a binary property of the photons, in this case whether they have a polarization at 45 degrees to the horizontal or not [3].

Physicists routinely measure polarization in their laboratories. They don’t use sunglasses; they use “polarization photodetectors” instead. Despite the intimidating name, these are essentially just like sunglasses, but have a more convenient shape and size for laboratory use, are more accurate, less fashionable, and far more expensive.

I’m now going to describe an experiment involving photon polarization that physicists can do in their laboratories. We’ll build up the description of the experiment piece by piece. Along the way there’s a few details that may seem ad hoc - some angles of polarization measurement, and things like that. Don’t worry too much about those ad hoc details, just try to get the basic picture straight.

Let’s start by imagining an experimentalist named Alice. Alice is measuring a photon to determine whether or not it has horizontal polarization. Alice will record A = 1 when it does have horizontal polarization, and A = -1 when it does not.

Of course, Alice might have decided to measure a different polarization, say at an angle of 45 degrees to the horizontal. Alice will record B = 1 when it has a polarization at 45 degrees to the horizontal, and B = -1 when it does not. Here’s a picture summarizing the different things I want you to imagine Alice doing. By the way, I haven’t put the photon she’s measuring in, but you should imagine it coming into the screen, towards the sunglasses:

Let’s move briefly away from photons, and back to coins. The usual way we think about the world is that the coin is either heads or tails, and our measurement reveals which. The coin intrinsically “knows” which side is facing up, i.e., its orientation is an intrinsic property of the coin itself. By analogy, you’d expect that a photon knows whether it has horizontal polarization or not. And it should also know whether it has a polarization at 45 degrees to horizontal or not.

It turns out the world isn’t that simple. What I’ll now prove to you is that there are fundamental physical properties that don’t have an independent existence like this. In particular, we’ll see that prior to Alice measuring the A or B polarization, the photon itself does not actually know what the value for A or B is going to be. This is utterly unlike our everyday experience - it’s as though a coin doesn’t decide whether to be heads or tails until we’ve measured it.

That last paragraph may have sounded like gobbledygook. In fact, if it didn’t give you pause, I suggest you go back and reread it. The reason it’s difficult to understand is because the paragraph is really a declaration of non-understanding, a declaration that the world is radically different from our intuitive understanding.

To prove this, what we’ll do is first proceed on the assumption that our everyday view of the world is correct. That is, we’ll assume that photons really do know whether they have horizontal polarization or not, i.e., they have intrinsic values A = 1 or A = -1 (and, for that matter, B =1 or B = -1). We’ll find that this assumption leads us to a conclusion that is contradicted by real experiments. The only way this could be the case was if our original assumption was in fact wrong, i.e., photons don’t have intrinsic properties in this way.

This strategy may sound complex, but we reason similarly quite often in our everyday experience. Imagine your Aunt has shown you how to bake a cake. You decide to bake it on your own, but realize partway through that you’ve forgotten whether she said to put one or two cups of flour into the cake. You decide to proceed on the assumption that it was one cup of flour. Unfortunately, the cake falls and is a disaster; you conclude that your original assumption was wrong, and the cake must have needed two cups. In a similar way, if we proceed on the assumption that photons do have intrinsic values for A and B, and then arrive at a contradiction with experiment, we’ll know our original assumption must have been wrong.

Alright, let’s finish describing the experiment. In addition to Alice, the experiment involves another experimentalist, Bob, and a third person, Eve, who prepares two photons, and sends one to Alice, and one to Bob. When the photon gets to Alice, she measures one of the polarization values, A or B, as described above. She makes the choice of which to measure at random (e.g., by flipping a coin), for reasons which we’ll understand later. When the photon gets to Bob, he decides at random to measure either the polarization C, at 22.5 degrees to horizontal, or D, at 67.5 degrees to horizontal. Here’s a picture summarizing what’s going on, but leaving out Eve and the photons that she sent to Alice and Bob:

To make this all more concrete, let’s think about what might happen in a typical instance of the experiment. Over on Alice’s side, she decides to measure the B polarization of her photon, and gets the result 1, i.e., the polarization at 45 degrees to horizontal. Over on Bob’s side, he decides to measure the C polarization of his photon, and gets the result -1, i.e., the photon does not have polarization at 22.5 degrees to horizontal.

You might imagine Alice, Bob and Eve doing this experiment many times. If they did this, they could conveniently represent the separate runs of the experiment in a table:


A B
1  
-1  
  1
-1  
C D
  1
-1  
1  
  1

Each row of the table represents a single run of the experiment, so this table shows a case where they did the experiment four times. Looking at the first row of the table, we see that in the first run of the experiment Alice chose to measure A, and got the result 1, while Bob chose to measure D, and also got the result 1.

Now that we’ve understood how the experiment is performed, let’s move on to the analysis. Remember, we’re starting from the assumption that the respective photons have independently existing and well-defined values for A, B, C, and D. Two of these four values are revealed in any given instance of the experiment, depending on what Alice and Bob choose to measure. However, because all four quantities have (by assumption) an independent existence, we can consider quantities which involve all four, like the quantity Q defined by the equation

Q = AC + BC + BD - AD.

(Things like AC mean A times C - it makes the essay less messy to omit the multiplication sign.)

I must apologize for springing this quantity Q on you completely out of the blue. It’s as though a friend suddenly started reciting ancient poetry in mid-conversation; you would certainly wonder why. It turns out that the easiest way to understand this material is to accept the definition of Q for now, and move forward. With a little more work, we’ll see that thinking about Q leads to some very interesting conclusions. With those conclusions in mind, we’ll be able to double back, and understand better where Q came from.

Although Q’s definition may appear to have come from out of the blue, it’s certainly easy enough to calculate for any given set of values for A, B, C, and D. For example, when A = 1, B = -1, C = 1 and D = -1 we get

Q = 1 x 1 + (-1) x 1 + (-1) x (-1) - 1 x (-1) = 2.

In fact, it turns out that no matter what value A, B, C and D have, the value of Q is always equal to either 2 or -2. If you like, you can run through all 16 sets of possible values for A, B, C and D, and verify that Q is indeed always either 2 or -2. I won’t go through all that here, although I encourage you to pause and go through the exercise on paper [4].

Now, when Alice and Bob actually do an experiment, Alice chooses to measure just one of A or B, and Bob chooses to measure just one of C or D. So they can’t actually measure Q directly, although on any given run they can determine one of the four terms that make up Q, that is, they can always determine one of AC, BC, BD or -AD.

But if they repeat the experiment many times, Alice and Bob can build up average value for each of the four quantities AC, BC, BD and -AD. Because the total of these four quantities is always 2 or -2, as we’ve seen, the sum of their averages over multiple runs of the experiment can not possibly be more than 2:

        Avg(AC)+Avg(BC)+Avg(BD)-Avg(AD) ≤ 2.

To understand why this is true, imagine you calculated the average population of all the countries in the world. Whatever the average is, it’s definitely going to be less than the population of China, which is the most populous country.

The inequality above is called the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality, after the names of its four discoverers. CHSH were building on earlier ideas of John Bell, who discovered a similar inequality in 1964.

You might wonder why we need to average in the CHSH inequality. Why can’t Alice measure both A and B, and Bob measure both C and D, so they can determine Q directly?

To understand this, remember that the idea we’re testing is the idea that the photon has an actual intrinsic value for A and an actual intrinsic value for B, each of which is merely revealed by the measurement. A single photon is quite delicate, and if Alice measured both A and B, there’s a chance the measurement of A would interfere with the measurement of B, and vice versa, and so mess up the measurement of Q. To keep things clean we force Alice to choose which one she wants to measure in any given instance, and stick to it. That’s why we have to work with averages over many experiments.

If you’re a bit more paranoid, you might also wonder if maybe Alice’s measurement could interfere with what Bob sees. This may seem unlikely, but it’s at least plausible. But Einstein’s relativity tells us that no influence can travel faster than the speed of light. If Alice and Bob do their measurements simultaneously and very quickly, nothing Alice does can possibly affect what Bob sees.

So, in principle, it ought to be possible for Alice and Bob to do the experiment many times, and work out the averages Avg(AC), Avg(BC), and so on, and check that the CHSH inequality does, in fact, hold.

An experiment testing this was done in the early 1980s, by Alain Aspect’s group, in France [5]. Experimentally, they found that if Eve prepares the two photons in just the right way, then what Alice and Bob see after many runs of the experiment is:

Avg(AC)+Avg(BC)+Avg(BD)-Avg(AD) ≅ 2.8.

That is, Aspect found that the CHSH inequality fails to hold in the real world! This means our belief that objects have intrinsic properties with their own independent existence must actually be wrong. The experimental failure of the CHSH inequality forces us to seek an alternate way of understanding the world, a way radically different from our conventional way of thinking.

Fortunately, a more radical theory of the world is available, a theory in which objects don’t have intrinsic properties that exist in and of themselves. That more radical theory is quantum mechanics. I won’t explain how the quantum mechanical analysis of the Aspect experiment works; that’s not the point of this essay. I will report though, that if you use quantum mechanics to analyze Aspect’s experiment, the prediction you get matches the experimental results exactly. In fact, Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt had already done the quantum mechanical analysis in advance of the experiment, and knew this. What the Aspect experiment did was provide a real-world example where the CHSH inequality demonstrably fails, yet quantum mechanics explains the results perfectly [6].

The analysis done in this essay can be extended to nearly all physical properties. In principle, it holds even for everyday properties like whether a coin is heads or tails, whether a cat is alive or dead, or nearly anything else you care to think of. Although experiments like the Aspect experiment are still far too difficult to do for these much more complex systems, quantum mechanics predicts that in principle it should be possible to do an experiment with these systems where the CHSH inequality fails. Assuming this is the case - and all the evidence points that way - at some fundamental level it is a mistake to think even of everyday properties as having an intrinsic independent existence.

You might wonder what this all means. Should you lose your belief in the idea that objects have intrinsic properties with an independent existence? Should you start thinking about your coins or your cat as though they might be in some indeterminate state? The answer, of course, is no: believing in such intrinsic properties is a perfectly good way to go about your everyday life. In fact, quantum physicists have spent quite a bit of time trying to understand why it is that so many properties in practice do behave like intrinsic properties with their own independent existence. The analysis is complex, but the final conclusion is unambiguous: for most practical everyday purposes, we can treat a coin as knowing whether it is heads or tails, and a cat as knowing whether it is alive or dead. Although these beliefs are not correct at some fundamental level, in most practical situations they work extremely well. It’s only in extraordinary circumstances quite outside everyday life that this way of thinking could ever lead you astray.

I promised that we’d go back and try to understand where Q comes from. In fact, Q was no less mysterious for Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt than it is for you. When they started their work, they had in mind an argument roughly like the one above (which was inspired by Bell) but they did not have a specific form for Q in mind. Their idea was to find a form for Q using trial-and-error so that they could prove an inequality like the CHSH inequality, and also simultaneously find a situation where quantum mechanics predicted that the inequality should fail to hold. That strategy allowed them to suggest an experiment - the experiment ultimately done by Aspect - which could be used to test between the two views of reality. I don’t know how long it took them to find their form for Q, but I suspect it took hundreds of hours of hard work. If you’ve been wondering what Q “means”, that’s your answer: it’s the answer to the question Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt’s were asking about what quantity would best let them distinguish between our usual picture of the world, and the actual reality. Given how long it took them to answer that question, it would not be surprising if you got a bit of a jolt when I introduced Q out of the blue.

The need for quantum mechanics isn’t ordinarily explained the way I have described in this essay. I think this is a pity, because the explanation here is, in my opinion, simpler, more compelling, and more clearcut [7] than the standard explanation.

The standard explanation is based on the historical development of quantum mechanics between 1900 and 1930. During that time there were a series of crises in physics. The pattern was that each time some experimental fact would be noticed that seemed hard to explain with the old “classical” way of viewing the world. Each time, physicists would bandage over the old classical thinking with an ad hoc bandaid. This happened over and over again until, in the mid-1920s, the sick patient of classical physics finally keeled over completely, and was replaced with the new framework of quantum mechanics.

The problem with this style of explanation, and what makes it confusing, is that none of those early crises was entirely clearcut. In each case, there were physicists who argued that the new experimental results could be explained pretty well with a conventional classical picture. And, in fact, with hindsight, we can now see that some of these crises have pretty good explanations that are essentially classical.

What’s beautiful about the CHSH inequality and the Aspect experiment is that they are so simple and compelling. They leave no doubt that we have to abandon our conventional assumptions about the world, and confront the need for a radically new theory. That theory is quantum mechanics.

Further reading

If you liked this essay, you may enjoy my essay “What makes quantum computers powerful”, to appear on this blog in two weeks time.

An excellent elementary introduction to quantum mechanics is Richard Feynman’s QED: The Strange Theory of Light and Matter.

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You may enjoy some of my other essays.

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Dave Bacon, Jen Dodd, Mary Granade, Kate Nielsen, Amund Tveit, and Jo Vermeulen for feedback that improved an early draft of this essay.

About the author

Between 1995 and 2008, Michael Nielsen was a professional theoretical physicist. During that time he co-authored the standard text on quantum computing, proved one of the fundamental theorems about the behaviour of entangled quantum states, and participated in one of the first quantum teleportation experiments. None of this made him feel comfortable with quantum mechanics.

Michael is now a writer living outside Toronto, and working on a book about “The Future of Science”. A taste of the book may be found here. If you’d like to be notified when the book is available, please send a blank email to the.future.of.science@gmail.com with the subject “subscribe book”. You’ll be emailed to let you know when the book is to be published; your email address will not be used for any other purpose.

Footnotes

[1] Of course, a coin might also land on its side. We’ll ignore that for the purposes of the present discussion.

[2] Not all sunglasses are polarizing in this way. But many are. You can check if your sunglasses are polarizing by holding them up towards pretty much any surface that reflects glare. The ocean or a pool on a sunny day work well.

[3] You might be wondering whether there’s any relationship between a photon having horizontal polarization, and having polarization at 45 degrees (or some other angle) to horizontal. This is a good question, and the answer is that there is a relationship. But it would take us quite a ways afield to understand the relationship, and we don’t need it for the purposes of this essay, so I’ve skipped over it.

[4] An alternate way of seeing that Q is always 2 or -2 starts by rewriting Q as

Q = (A+B)C + (B-A)D.

We can split our analysis up into two cases: the case when A = B, and the case when A = -B. One of these two must always be true, because A and B are both always either 1 or -1.

First case: A = B. In this case the B-A terms in Q vanish, leaving just contributions from the (A+B)C term. A bit of thought and experimentation should convince you this is either 2 or -2.

Second case: A = -B. The A+B terms vanish, leaving just contributions from the (B-A)D term, which again a bit of thought should convince you is either 2 or -2.

[5] Real experiments have imperfections, and Aspect and his co-workers had to use a careful analysis to take those imperfections into account. For example, the polarization photodetectors in the experiment would sometimes miss a photon, and this needs to be taken into account in analyzing the results. I won’t go into all those details here. More modern experiments are getting very close to the ideal experiment described in my essay.

[6] When people see the CHSH inequality and the results of the Aspect experiment for the first time, they sometimes say “oh, isn’t that just like the uncertainty principle, where particles don’t have a simultaneously well-defined position and momentum?” It is similar, but the contradiction of the CHSH inequality by experiment is a much stronger result. It’s true that the uncertainy principle does say that in quantum mechanics, a particle can’t have a simultaneously well-defined position and momentum. But this is just an assertion about the theory of quantum mechanics. The CHSH inequality and the Aspect experiment give us a direct experimental disproof of the idea that a particle has real intrinsic properties with their own independent existence.

[7] There are still a few people who believe that it’s possible to avoid the conclusion that the CHSH inequality and Aspect’s experiment force on us. There are two common lines of attack. The first is to argue that something Alice does can instantaneously influence what Bob sees, but in a way that doesn’t allow faster-than-light signalling. This is an interesting line of thought, but is in its own way also quite a radical departure from classical thought. The second is to argue that somehow the fact that the polarization photodetectors sometimes miss a photon is responsible for the failure of the CHSH inequality. Both these lines of attack continue to be developed, although neither is regarded as mainstream.

General 01 Aug 2008 06:53 am

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General 30 Jul 2008 04:31 pm

Why I’d rather be an optimist than a pessimist

A pessimist can only achieve great things by accident, whereas an optimist can hope to do them by design.

General 28 Jul 2008 06:53 am

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General 24 Jul 2008 12:08 pm

Shirky’s Law and why (most) social software fails

Shirky’s Law states that the social software most likely to succeed has “a brutally simple mental model … that’s shared by all users”.

If you use social software like Flickr or Digg, you know what this means. You can give friends a simple and compelling explanation of these sites in seconds: “it’s a website that lets you upload photos so your friends can also see them”; “it’s a community website that lets you suggest interesting sites; the users vote on submissions to determine what’s most interesting”. Of course, for each Flickr or Digg there are hundreds of failed social sites. The great majority either fail to obey Shirky’s Law, or else are knockoffs that do little not already done by an existing site.

To understand why Shirky’s Law is important, let’s look at a site where it’s violated. The site is Nature Network, one of the dozens of social networking sites aspiring to be “Facebook for scientists”. Like other social networks, Nature Network lets you connect to other users. When you make a connection, you’re asked whether you would like to connect as a “friend” or a “colleague”. Sometimes the choice is easy. But sometimes it’s not so easy. Furthermore, if someone else connects to you, you’re automatically asked to connect to them, but given no immediate clue whether they connected as a friend or as a colleague. The only thing shared in the users’ mental model at this point is acute awkwardness, and possibly a desire to never connect to anyone on Nature Network again.

I don’t mean to pick on Nature Network. It’s the most useful of the social networks for scientists. But it and most other social websites (apart from the knockoffs) don’t even come close to obeying Shirky’s Law.

Why is Shirky’s Law so hard for developers to obey? I’ll give three reasons.

The first reason is that developers often have a flawed mental model of their own software. Imagine you’re developing social software. You spend hundreds or thousands of hours on the task. In your mind’s eye, you imagine the user interacting with your software, and reason that if the user is given more capabilities, they’ll be happier.

There’s an implicit mental model being used to make decisions here. It’s a mental model of a system with two parts - the software and the user. A real user’s mental model is quite different. It’s them, the software, and the entire network of other users. How they use the software is strongly conditioned on their mental model of how other users use it. If they lack confidence in that mental model, they have less incentive to use the software themselves, as the Nature Network example shows. The more social the software, the stronger this effect.

Most developers are not stupid, and intellectually they know the user experience involves both the software and the network of other users. But their own experience, day in and day out, is of being a single user working with the software. At this stage the network of other users is a theoretical abstraction. It’s easy to get sucked into doing things that would make a single user’s experience better, but makes the experience of a network of users worse. This is a large part of why it’s so important to build a base of beta users as quickly as possible, and to release early and often.

A second reason developers fail to obey Shirky’s Law is the desire to do impressive-seeming things. Software that looks complex is much more impressive to other hackers, venture capitalists, and non-hacker friends and family.

I’ve heard hackers brag that they could have built Twitter over a weekend. Underlying this boast is a misunderstanding of what is truly impressive. Coming up with Twitter required only a small amount of technical knowledge. The hard part was the social insight to realize such a tool would be useful. This is a social insight the bragging hackers didn’t have.

It’s no accident that many of the people who’ve been most successful at building social software have strong interests outside computing. Mark Zuckerberg, the founder of Facebook, studied both computer science and psychology at Harvard. Alan Kay, arguably the father of modern computing, has a list of recommended reading. There’s barely a technical book on it. It’s all psychology, anthropology, philosophy, and so on.

A strange consequence of all this is that much of the most successful social software was invented by accident.

Ward Cunningham invented the first wiki because he was tired of responding to user’s requests to update a website he ran. To save himself time, he made the page editable, and told them to update it themselves. He was shocked when this small change utterly transformed the dynamics of the site.

One of the first widely used pieces of blogging software, Blogger, was originally a small part of a much more ambitious project management system. The project management system never caught on, but Blogger took off.

The team that developed Flickr wasn’t originally building a photo sharing service. They were building a multiplayer online game, and decided to let players share photos with one another. When they realized the players were more interested in sharing photos than playing the game, they dumped the game, and built Flickr.

Shirky’s Law does not mean the software itself needs to be simple. Social software like Digg and FriendFeed uses complex algorithms to rank the relative importance of submitted items. But the complex parts of the software are hidden from the user, and so do not add to the complexity of the users’ mental models.

There are some apparent exceptions to Shirky’s Law. For example, Facebook is now a successful and complex piece of social software. But in the early days, Facebook was extremely simple, and this simplicity fueled their rapid growth: “it’s a site where you can connect to your friends, and show them what you’re up to”. Complexity can only come later, when users are already confident in their shared understanding.

The third reason developers fail to obey Shirky’s Law is that it’s difficult to do. The most successful social software starts out doing one task supremely well. That task is simple, useful, and original. It’s easy to come up with a task which is useful and original - just combine existing ideas in a new way, perhaps with some minor twists. But finding something that’s also simple is hard. It has to be a single task that can’t be reduced or explained in terms of existing tasks. Inventing or discovering such a task requires either a lot of hard work and social insight, or a great deal of luck. It’s no wonder most social software fails.

Further reading

This essay is adapted from a book I’m writing about The Future of Science. If you’d like to be notified when the book is available, please send a blank email to the.future.of.science@gmail.com with the subject “subscribe book”. I’ll email you to let you know in advance of publication. I will not use your email address for any other purpose!

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Acknowledgments

Thanks to Jen Dodd for feedback that improved this essay.

General 21 Jul 2008 06:53 am

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General 18 Jul 2008 06:53 am

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Social software & Future of Science 17 Jul 2008 03:36 pm

The Future of Science

Building a better collective memory

In your High School science classes you may have learnt Hooke’s law, the law of physics which relates a spring’s length to how hard you pull on it. What your High School science teacher probably didn’t tell you is that when Robert Hooke discovered his law in 1676, he published it as an anagram, “ceiiinossssttuv”, which he revealed two years later as the Latin “ut tensio, sic vis”, meaning “as the extension, so the force”. This ensured that if someone else made the same discovery, Hooke could reveal the anagram and claim priority, thus buying time in which he alone could build upon the discovery.

Hooke was not unusual. Many great scientists of the age, including Leonardo, Galileo and Huygens, used anagrams or ciphers for similar purposes. The Newton-Leibniz controversy over who invented calculus occurred because Newton claimed to have invented calculus in the 1660s and 1670s, but didn’t publish until 1693. In the meantime, Leibniz developed and published his own version of calculus. Imagine modern biology if the human genome had been announced as an anagram, or if publication had been delayed thirty years.

Why were Hooke, Newton, and their contemporaries so secretive? In fact, up until this time discoveries were routinely kept secret. Alchemists intent on converting lead into gold or finding the secret of eternal youth would often take their discoveries with them to their graves. A secretive culture of discovery was a natural consequence of a society in which there was often little personal gain in sharing discoveries.

The great scientific advances in the time of Hooke and Newton motivated wealthy patrons such as the government to begin subsidizing science as a profession. Much of the motivation came from the public benefit delivered by scientific discovery, and that benefit was strongest if discoveries were shared. The result was a scientific culture which to this day rewards the sharing of discoveries with jobs and prestige for the discoverer.

This cultural transition was just beginning in the time of Hooke and Newton, but a little over a century later the great physicist Michael Faraday could advise a younger colleague to “Work. Finish. Publish.” The culture of science had changed so that a discovery not published in a scientific journal was not truly complete. Today, when a scientist applies for a job, the most important part of the application is their published scientific papers. But in 1662, when Hooke applied for the job of Curator of Experiments at the Royal Society, he certainly was not asked for such a record, because the first scientific journals weren’t created until three years later, in 1665.

The adoption and growth of the scientific journal system has created a body of shared knowledge for our civilization, a collective long-term memory which is the basis for much of human progress. This system has changed surprisingly little in the last 300 years. The internet offers us the first major opportunity to improve this collective long-term memory, and to create a collective short-term working memory, a conversational commons for the rapid collaborative development of ideas. The process of scientific discovery - how we do science - will change more over the next 20 years than in the past 300 years.

This change will not be achieved without great effort. From the outside, scientists currently appear puzzlingly slow to adopt many online tools. We’ll see that this is a consequence of some major barriers deeply embedded within the culture of science. The first part of this essay is about these barriers, and how to overcome them. The second part of the essay illustrates these ideas, with a proposal for an online collaboration market where scientists can rapidly outsource scientific problems.

Part I: Toward a more open scientific culture

How can the internet benefit science?

How can the internet improve the way we do science? There are two useful ways to answer this question. The first is to view online tools as a way of expanding the range of scientific knowledge that can be shared with the world:



Many online tools do just this, and some have had a major impact on how scientists work. Two successful examples are the physics preprint arXiv, which lets physicists share preprints of their papers without the months-long delay typical of a conventional journal, and GenBank, an online database where biologists can deposit and search for DNA sequences. But most online tools of this type remain niche applications, often despite the fact that many scientists believe broad adoption would be valuable. Two examples are the Journal of Visualized Experiments, which lets scientists upload videos which show how their experiments work, and open notebook science, as practiced by scientists like Jean-Claude Bradley and Garrett Lisi, who expose their working notes to the world. In the coming years we’ll see a proliferation of tools of this type, each geared to sharing different types of knowledge:



There is a second and more radical way of thinking about how the internet can change science, and that is through a change to the process and scale of creative collaboration itself, a change enabled by social software such as wikis, online forums, and their descendants.

There are already many well-known but still striking instances of this change in parts of culture outside of science [1]. For example, in 1991 an unknown Finnish student named Linus Torvalds posted a short note in an online forum, asking for help extending a toy operating system he’d programmed in his spare time; a volunteer army responded by assembling Linux, one of the most complex engineering artifacts ever constructed. In 2001 another young unknown named Larry Sanger posted a short note asking for help building an online Encyclopedia; a volunteer army responded by assembling the world’s most comprehensive Encyclopedia. In 1999, Garry Kasparov, the greatest chessplayer of all time, played and eventually won a game of chess against a “World Team” which decided its moves by the votes of thousands of chessplayers, many rank amateurs; instead of the easy victory he expected, he got the most challenging game of his career, a game he called “the greatest game in the history of chess”.

These examples are not curiosities, or special cases; they are just the leading edge of the greatest change in the creative process since the invention of writing.

Science is an example par excellence of creative collaboration, yet scientific collaboration still takes place mainly via face-to-face meetings. With the exception of email, few of the new social tools have been broadly adopted by scientists, even though it is these tools which have the greatest potential to improve how science is done.

Why have scientists been so slow to adopt these remarkable tools? Is it simply that they are too conservative in their habits, or that the new tools are no better than what we already have? Both these glib answers are wrong. We’ll resolve this puzzle by looking in detail at two examples where excellent online tools have failed to be adopted by scientists. What we’ll find is that there are major cultural barriers which are preventing scientists from getting involved, and so slowing down the progress of science.

A failure of science online: online comment sites

Like many people, when I’m considering buying a book or electronic gadget, I often first browse the reviews at amazon.com. Inspired by the success of amazon.com and similar sites, several organizations have created comment sites where scientists can share their opinions of scientific papers. Perhaps the best-known was Nature’s 2006 trial of open commentary on papers undergoing peer review at Nature. The trial was not a success. Nature’s final report terminating the trial explained:

There was a significant level of expressed interest in open peer review… A small majority of those authors who did participate received comments, but typically very few, despite significant web traffic. Most comments were not technically substantive. Feedback suggests that there is a marked reluctance among researchers to offer open comments.

The Nature trial is just one of many attempts at comment sites for scientists. The earliest example I’m aware of is the Quick Reviews site, built in 1997, and discontinued in 1998. Physics Comments was built a few years later, and discontinued in 2006. A more recent site, Science Advisor, is still active, but has more members (1139) than reviews (1008). It seems that people want to read reviews of scientific papers, but not write them [2].

The problem all these sites have is that while thoughtful commentary on scientific papers is certainly useful for other scientists, there are few incentives for people to write such comments. Why write a comment when you could be doing something more “useful”, like writing a paper or a grant? Furthermore, if you publicly criticize someone’s paper, there’s a chance that that person may be an anonymous referee in a position to scuttle your next paper or grant application.

To grasp the mindset here, you need to understand the monklike intensity that ambitious young scientists bring to the pursuit of scientific publications and grants. To get a position at a major University the most important thing is an impressive record of scientific papers. These papers will bring in the research grants and letters of recommendation necessary to be hired. Competition for positions is so fierce that 80 hour plus work weeks are common. The pace relaxes after tenure, but continued grant support still requires a strong work ethic. It’s no wonder people have little inclination to contribute to the online comment sites.

The contrast between the science comment sites and the success of the amazon.com reviews is stark. To pick just one example, you’ll find
approximately 1500 reviews of Pokemon products at amazon.com, more than the total number of reviews on all the scientific comment sites I described above. The disincentives facing scientists have led to a ludicrous situation where popular culture is open enough that people feel comfortable writing Pokemon reviews, yet scientific culture is so closed that people will not publicly share their opinions of scientific papers. Some people find this contrast curious or amusing; I believe it signifies something seriously amiss with science, something we need to understand and change.

A failure of science online: Wikipedia

Wikipedia is a second example where scientists have missed an opportunity to innovate online. Wikipedia has a vision statement to warm a scientist’s heart: “Imagine a world in which every single human being can freely share in the sum of all knowledge. That’s our commitment.” You might guess Wikipedia was started by scientists eager to collect all of human knowledge into a single source. In fact, Wikipedia’s founder, Jimmy Wales, had a background in finance and as a web developer for an “erotic search engine”, not in science. In the early days few established scientists were involved. Just as for the scientific comment sites, to contribute aroused suspicion from colleagues that you were wasting time that could be spent writing papers and grants.

Some scientists will object that contributing to Wikipedia isn’t really science. And, of course, it’s not if you take a narrow view of what science is, if you’ve bought into the current game, and take it for granted that science is only about publishing in specialized scientific journals. But if you take a broader view, if you believe science is about discovering how the world works, and sharing that understanding with the rest of humanity, then the lack of early scientific support for Wikipedia looks like an opportunity lost. Nowadays, Wikipedia’s success has to some extent legitimized contribution within the scientific community. But how strange that the modern day Library of Alexandria had to come from outside academia.

The challenge: achieving extreme openness in science

These failures of science online are all examples where scientists show a surprising reluctance to share knowledge that could be useful to others. This is ironic, for the value of cultural openness was understood centuries ago by many of the founders of modern science; indeed, the journal system is perhaps the most open system for the transmission of knowledge that could be built with 17th century media. The adoption of the journal system was achieved by subsidizing scientists who published their discoveries in journals. This same subsidy now inhibits the adoption of more effective technologies, because it continues to incentivize scientists to share their work in conventional journals, and not in more modern media.

The situation is analogous to the government subsidies for corn-based ethanol in the United States. In the early days these seemed to many people to be a good idea, encouraging the use of what people hoped would be a more efficient fuel. But now we understand that there are more energy-efficient alternatives, such as grass-based cellulose ethanol. Unfortunately, the subsidies for corn-based ethanol are still in place, and now inhibit the adoption of the more efficient technologies.

We should aim to create an open scientific culture where as much information as possible is moved out of people’s heads and labs, onto the network, and into tools which can help us structure and filter the information. This means everything - data, scientific opinions, questions, ideas, folk knowledge, workflows, and everything else - the works. Information not on the network can’t do any good.

Ideally, we’ll achieve a kind of extreme openness. This means: making many more types of content available than just scientific papers; allowing creative reuse and modification of existing work through more open licensing and community norms; making all information not just human readable but also machine readable; providing open APIs to enable the building of additional services on top of the scientific literature, and possibly even multiple layers of increasingly powerful services. Such extreme openness is the ultimate expression of the idea that others may build upon and extend the work of individual scientists in ways they themselves would never have conceived.

The challenge of achieving a more open culture is also being confronted in popular culture. People such as Richard Stallman, Lawrence Lessig, Yochai Benkler, Cory Doctorow, and many others have described the benefits openness brings in a networked world, and developed tools such as Creative Commons licensing and free and open source software to help promote a more open culture, and fight the forces inhibiting it. As we have seen, however, science faces a unique set of forces that inhibit open culture - the centuries-old subsidy of old ways of sharing knowledge - and this requires a new understanding of how to overcome those forces.

How can we open up scientific culture?

To create an open scientific culture that embraces new online tools, two challenging tasks must be achieved: (1) build superb online tools; and (2) cause the cultural changes necessary for those tools to be accepted. The necessity of accomplishing both these tasks is obvious, yet projects in online science often focus mostly on building tools, with cultural change an afterthought. This is a mistake, for the tools are only part of the overall picture. It took just a few years for the first scientific journals (a tool) to be developed, but many decades of cultural change before journal publication was accepted as the gold standard for judging scientific contributions.

None of this is to discount the challenge of building superb online tools. To develop such tools requires a rare combination of strong design and technical skills, and a deep understanding of how science works. The difficulty is compounded because the people who best understand how science works are scientists themselves, yet building such tools is not something scientists are typically encouraged or well suited to do. Scientific institutions reward scientists for making discoveries within the existing system of discovery; there is little place for people working to change that system. A technologically-challenged Head of Department is unlikely to look kindly on a scientist who suggests that instead of writing papers they’d like to spend their research time developing general-purpose tools to improve how science is done.

What about the second task, achieving cultural change? As any revolutionary can attest, that’s a tough order. Let me describe two strategies that have been successful in the past, and that offer a template for future success.

The first is a top-down strategy that has been successfully used by the open access (OA) movement [3]. The goal of the OA movement is to make scientific research freely available online to everyone in the world. It’s an inspiring goal, and the OA movement has achieved some amazing successes. Perhaps most notably, in April 2008 the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) mandated that every paper written with the support of their grants must eventually be made open access. The NIH is the world’s largest grant agency; this decision is the scientific equivalent of successfully storming the Bastille.

The second strategy is bottom-up. It is for the people building the new online tools to also develop and boldly evangelize ways of measuring the contributions made with the tools. To understand what this means, imagine you’re a scientist sitting on a hiring committee that’s deciding whether or not to hire some scientist. Their curriculum vitae reports that they’ve helped build an open science wiki, and also write a blog. Unfortunately, the committee has no easy way of understanding the significance of these contributions, since as yet there are no broadly accepted metrics for assessing such contributions. The natural consequence is that such contributions are typically undervalued.

To make the challenge concrete, ask yourself what it would take for a description of the contribution made through blogging to be reported by a scientist on their curriculum vitae. How could you measure the different sorts of contributions a scientist can make on a blog - outreach, education, and research? These are not easy questions to answer. Yet they must be answered before scientific blogging will be accepted as a valuable professional scientific contribution.

A success story: the arXiv and SPIRES

Let’s look at an example illustrating the bottom-up strategy in action. The example is the well-known physics preprint arXiv. Since 1991 physicists have been uploading their papers to the arXiv, often at about the same time as they submit to a journal. The papers are made available within hours for anyone to read. The arXiv is not refereed, although a quick check is done by arXiv moderators to remove crank submissions. The arXiv is an excellent and widely-used tool, with more than half of all new papers in physics appearing there first. Many physicists start their day by seeing what’s appeared on the arXiv overnight. Thus, the arXiv exemplifies the first step for achieving a more open culture: it is a superb tool.

Not long after the arXiv began, a citation tracking service called SPIRES decided they would extend their service to include both arXiv papers and conventional journal articles. SPIRES specializes in particle physics, and as a result it’s now possible to search on a particle physicist’s name (example), and see how frequently all their papers, including arXiv preprints, have been cited by other physicists.

SPIRES has been run since 1974 by one of the most respected and highly visible institutions in particle physics, the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC). The effort SLAC has put into developing SPIRES means that their metrics of citation impact are both credible and widely used by the particle physics community. It’s now possible for a particle physicist to convincingly demonstrate that their work is having a high impact, even if it has only been submitted to the arXiv, and has not been published in a conventional scientific journal. When physics hiring committees meet to evaluate candidates in particle physics, people often have their laptops out, examining and comparing the SPIRES citation records of candidates.

The arXiv and SPIRES have not stopped particle physicists from publishing in peer-reviewed journals. When you’re applying for jobs, or up for tenure, every ounce of ammunition helps, especially when the evaluating committee may contain someone from another field who is reluctant to take the SPIRES citation data seriously. Still, particle physicists have become noticeably more relaxed about publication, and it’s not uncommon to see a CV which includes preprints that haven’t been published in conventional journals. This is an example of the sort of cultural change that can be achieved using the bottom-up strategy. In the next part, we’ll see how far these ideas can be pushed in pursuit of new tools for collaboration.

Part II: Collaboration Markets: building a collective working memory for science

The problem of collaboration

Even Albert Einstein needed help occasionally. Einstein’s greatest contribution to science was his theory of gravity, often called the general theory of relativity. He worked on and off on this theory between 1907 and 1915, often running into great difficulties. By 1912, he had come to the astonishing conclusion that our ordinary conception of geometry, in which the angles of a triangle add up to 180 degrees, is only approximately correct, and a new kind of geometry is needed to correctly describe space and time. This was a great surprise to Einstein, and also a great challenge, since such geometric ideas were outside his expertise. Fortunately for Einstein and for posterity, he described his difficulties to a mathematician friend, Marcel Grossman. Grossman said that many of the ideas Einstein needed had already been developed by the mathematician Bernhard Riemann. It took Einstein three more years of work, but Grossman was right, and this was a critical point in the development of general relativity.

Einstein’s conundrum is familiar to any scientist. When doing research, subproblems constantly arise in unexpected areas. No-one can be expert in all those areas. Most of us instead stumble along, picking up the skills necessary to make progress towards our larger goals, grateful when the zeitgeist of our research occasionally throws up a subproblem in which we are already truly expert. Like Einstein, we have a small group of trusted collaborators with whom we exchange questions and ideas when we are stuck. Unfortunately, most of the time even our collaborators aren’t that much help. They may point us in the right direction, but rarely do they have exactly the expertise we need. Is it possible to scale up this conversational model, and build an online collaboration market [4] to exchange questions and ideas, a sort of collective working memory for the scientific community?

It is natural to be skeptical of this idea, but an extremely demanding creative culture already exists which shows that such a collaboration market is feasible - the culture of free and open source software. Scientists browsing for the first time through the development forums of open source programming projects are often shocked at the high level of the discussion. They expect amateur hour at the local Karaoke bar; instead, they find professional programmers routinely sharing their questions and ideas, helping solve each other’s problems, often exerting great intellectual effort and ingenuity. Rather than hoarding their questions and ideas, as scientists do for fear of being scooped, the programmers revel in swapping them. Some of the world’s best programmers hang out in these forums, swapping tips, answering questions, and participating in the conversation.

Innocentive

I’ll now describe two embryonic examples which suggest that collaboration markets for science may be valuable. The first is Innocentive, a service that allows companies like Eli Lilly and Proctor and Gamble to pose Challenges over the internet, scientific research problems with associated prizes for their solution, often many thousands of dollars. For example, one of the Challenges currently on Innocentive asks participants to find a biomarker for motor neuron disease, with a one million dollar prize. If you register for the site, it’s possible to obtain a detailed description of the Challenge requirements, and attempt to win the prize. More than 140,000 people from 175 countries have registered, and prizes for more than 100 Challenges have been awarded.

Innocentive is an example of how a market in scientific problems and solutions can be established. Of course, it has shortcomings as a model for collaboration in basic research. Only a small number of companies are able to pose Challenges, and they may do so only after a lengthy vetting process. Innocentive’s business model is aimed firmly at industrial rather than basic research, and so the incentives revolve around money and intellectual property, rather than reputation and citation. It’s certainly not a rapid-fire conversational tool like the programming forums; one does not wake up in the morning with a problem in mind, and post it to Innocentive, hoping for help with a quick solution.

FriendFeed

FriendFeed is a much more fluid tool which is being used by scientists as a conversational medium to discuss scientific research problems. What FriendFeed allows users to do is set up what’s called a lifestream. As an example, my lifestream is set up to automatically aggregate pretty much everything I put on the web, including my blog posts, del.icio.us links, YouTube videos, and several other types of content:



I also subscribe to a list of about one hundred or so “friends” (a few are listed on the right in the screenshot above) whose lifestreams I can see aggregated into one giant river of information - all their Flickr photos, blog posts, and so on. These people aren’t necessarily real friends - I’m not personally acquainted with my “friend” Barack Obama - but it’s a fantastic way of tracking a high volume of activity from a large number of people.

As part of the lifestream, FriendFeed allows messages to be passed back and forth in a lightweight way, so communities can form around common interests and shared friendships. In April 2008, Cameron Neylon, a chemist from the University of Southampton, used FriendFeed messaging to post a request for assistance in building molecular models. Pretty quickly Pawel Szczesny replied, and said he could help out. A scientific collaboration was now underway. The original request and discussion is shown here:



FriendFeed is a great service, but it suffers from many of the same problems that afflict the comment sites and Wikipedia. Lacking widely accepted metrics to measure contribution, scientists are unlikely to adopt FriendFeed en masse as a medium for scientific collaboration. And without widespread adoption, the utility of FriendFeed for scientific collaboration will remain relatively low.

The economics of collaboration

How much is lost due to inefficiencies in the current system of collaboration? To answer this question, imagine a scientist named Alice. Like most scientists, many of Alice’s research projects spontaneously give rise to problems in areas in which she isn’t expert. She juggles hundreds or thousands of such problems, re-examining each occasionally, and looking to make progress, but knowing that only rarely is she the person best suited to solve any given problem.

Suppose that for a particular problem, Alice estimates that it would take her 4-5 weeks to acquire the required expertise and solve the problem. That’s a long time, and so the problem is on the backburner. Unbeknownst to Alice, though, there is another scientist in another part of the world, Bob, who has just the skills to solve the problem in less than a day. This is not at all uncommon. Quite the contrary; my experience is that this is the usual situation. Consider the example of Grossmann, who saved Einstein what might otherwise have been years of extra work.

Do Alice and Bob exchange questions and ideas, and start working towards a solution to Alice’s problem? Unfortunately, nine times out of ten they never even meet, or if they meet, they just exchange small talk. It’s an opportunity lost for a mutually beneficial trade, a loss that may cost weeks of work for Alice. It’s also a great loss for the society that bears the cost of doing science, a loss that must run to billions of dollars each year in total. Expert attention, the ultimate scarce resource in science, is very inefficiently allocated under existing practices for collaboration.

An efficient collaboration market would enable Alice and Bob to find this common interest, and exchange their know-how, in much the same way eBay and craigslist enable people to exchange goods and services. However, in order for this to be possible, a great deal of mutual trust is required. Without such trust, there’s no way Alice will be willing to advertise her questions to the entire community. The danger of free riders who will take advantage for their own benefit (and to Alice’s detriment) is just too high.

In science, we’re so used to this situation that we take it for granted. But let’s compare to the apparently very different problem of buying shoes. Alice walks into a shoestore, with some money. Alice wants shoes more than she wants to keep her money, but Bob the shoestore owner wants the money more than he wants the shoes. As a result, Bob hands over the shoes, Alice hands over the money, and everyone walks away happier after just ten minutes. This rapid transaction takes place because there is a trust infrastructure of laws and enforcement in place that ensures that if either party cheats, they are likely to be caught and punished.

If shoestores operated like scientists trading ideas, first Alice and Bob would need to get to know one another, maybe go for a few beers in a nearby bar. Only then would Alice finally say “you know, I’m looking for some shoes”. After a pause, and a few more beers, Bob would say “You know what, I just happen to have some shoes I’m looking to sell”. Every working scientist recognizes this dance; I know scientists who worry less about selling their house than they do about exchanging scientific information.

In economics, it’s been understood for hundreds of years that wealth is created when we lower barriers to trade, provided there is a trust infrastructure of laws and enforcement to prevent cheating and ensure trade is uncoerced. The basic idea, which goes back to David Ricardo in 1817, is to concentrate on areas where we have a comparative advantage, and to avoid areas where we have a comparative disadvantage.

Although Ricardo’s work was in economics, his analysis works equally well for trade in ideas. Indeed, even were Alice to be far more competent than Bob, Ricardo’s analysis shows that both Alice and Bob benefit if Alice concentrates on areas where she has the greatest comparative advantage, and Bob on areas where he has less comparative disadvantage. Unfortunately, science currently lacks the trust infrastructure and incentives necessary for such free, unrestricted trade of questions and ideas.

An ideal collaboration market will enable just such an exchange of questions and ideas. It will bake in metrics of contribution so participants can demonstrate the impact their work is having. Contributions will be archived, timestamped, and signed, so it’s clear who said what, and when. Combined with high quality filtering and search tools, the result will be an open culture of trust which gives scientists a real incentive to outsource problems, and contribute in areas where they have a great comparative advantage. This will change science.

Further reading

I’m writing a book about “The Future of Science”. If you’d like to be notified when the book is available, please send a blank email to the.future.of.science@gmail.com with the subject “subscribe book”. I’ll email you to let you know in advance of publication. I will not use your email address for any other purpose!


If you’d like to read more, I recommend Bill Hooker’s series of essays on open science, Mitchell Waldrop’s article in Scientific American, and the Science Commons as starting places. There are some great communities of people online engaged in building a more open scientific culture - many of those people can be found in the Life Scientists and Science2.0 rooms on FriendFeed. Check them out.

Subscribe to my blog here.

Acknowledgments

Based on a keynote talk by Michael Nielsen at the New Communication Channels for Biology workshop, San Diego, June 26 and 27, 2008. Thanks to Krishna Subramanian and John Wooley for organizing the workshop, and all the participants for an enjoyable event. Thanks to Eva Amsen, Jen Dodd, Danielle Fong, Peter Rohde, Ben Toner, and Christian Weedbrook for providing feedback that greatly improved early drafts of this essay.

Footnotes

[1] Clay Shirky’s “Here Comes Everybody” is an excellent book that contains much of interest on new ways of collaborating.

[2] An ongoing experiment which incorporates online commentary and many other innovative features is PLoS ONE. It’s too early to tell how successful its commentary will be.

[3] I strongly recommend Peter Suber’s Open Access News as a superb resource on all things open access.

[4] Shirley Wu and Cameron Neylon have stimulating blog posts where they propose ideas closely related to collaboration markets.

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